From the print magazine:
From the New Polity Magazine Issue 3.4 (Fall 2022), the technology issue, printed with permission from Communio: International Catholic Review 9.3 (Fall 1982):238-246.
For a theologian to speak on questions of technological security may appear from the outset strange and unprofessional: security as a factor in technological constructions is a problem to be solved by technology, a problem for which only the engineer can offer a concrete contribution. Of course, we can reply right away: It is because security presents itself as an ethical task to technology in the first place that security appears as a technological problem for technology to solve. In this context we can address the very general question of the relationship between ethics and technology.
In the first phase of modern technology, the question hardly seemed to be asked. Capability of itself meant right, even necessity; nor was technological ability to be restrained by external concerns, by “irrelevant” moral objections. Technology justified itself as the realization of human potential and human freedom itself. To exercise the spirit freely up to the limit of one’s capability and with no other limit than precisely this appeared to be the way man’s ethical nature manifested itself. To fulfill oneself, to achieve one’s freedom, the freedom of knowing and of acting from knowledge free of taboo and prohibition—such was the new morality. This was supposed to set one free from primitive forces and fears disguised as morals, free for the autonomy of the man bound pure and simply to the logic of the scientific enlightenment. Technology and physics had, as it were, absorbed ethics. “Scientific-technological thinking is actually able to free us from that dominion which nature exercises over us insofar as it helps us to dominion over nature .... Traditional morality, guided by the concepts of good and evil, has not been able to bring about this liberation. It turned pale beside the brilliant reality of this liberation, then appeared superfluous and finally detrimental and ‘reactionary.’ Liberation itself appeared as the new morality; the scientific-technological enlightenment was considered identical with enlightenment itself.” [1]
But then, in the second half of the 20th century, what Horkheimer and Adorno have called “the dialectic of enlightenment” became noticeably evident. [2] We began to feel the threat in technology to man and the world. The dependence of man on great technological systems had brought with itself his dependence on central administrations and thus simultaneously the impotence of the individual, his incorporation into impenetrable and inescapable anonymous systems of government, against which an even louder cry of revolt then arose. Morality, which had previously become identified with technology, now turned unexpectedly against it. Surprisingly, our situation today is characterized by the fact that technology is denied any morality, and moral revolt alone is seen as ethical behavior, which now sets the limits for technology or fully damns it. To oppose fully or simply "to drop out": these present themselves as the new ways to behave.
In this situation the question of the morality of technology and of technology as moral art becomes a question of survival. The total identification of old has been shattered, an identification which had actually come about from a previously total separation insofar as morality had been eliminated from the calculation as an immaterial, unexplained remainder. The modem re-establishment of a total separation under reversed signs only demonstrates how urgent it is to seek a responsible synthesis of practical and theoretical reason, of ethical and scientific enlightenment, as opposed to the models of separation and identification—which are ultimately identical and which mutually call forth one another. The topic of “security” presents itself as a starting point because the newly erupting elemental fear of the destructive insecurity in modem technology directly accounted for the turn described above in the relationship between ethics and morality in the second half of the 20th century.
The theme of “security” as a question about the structure of what is ethical according to the moral tradition
When we come, of course, to ask of classical ethics what it has to say concerning the theme of security, we observe that the problem was not posed as the ethical problem of technological ability because it did not exist as such (although serious problems of technological security did come up in the context of such constructions as bridges and cathedrals, which nevertheless differed qualitatively from ours, as we intend to show). We must further note that the issue was developed as a fundamental problem of ethical principles, not in social ethics but in the ethics of the individual.
Let us nevertheless take a brief look at this context, for it illustrates in any case a basic framework of values which may remain important for our question. It is of interest, first of all, that the magisterium felt compelled in the 17th century to condemn a teaching concerning the fundamental orientation of moral behavior that has come down in history under the title of tutiorism. It maintains that man, in making a decision must guide himself according to the given laws and thus must always choose that option which corresponds most surely to the law in each case. That means that it is not a conformity to reality that leads to a decision but the positivistic security of a direction derived from the law. This conception binding man completely to an alien will—that of the law-giver—and fundamentally denying him his own capacity for ethical insights was rejected by the magisterium as opposed to the Christian vision of man to the personal moral responsibility of the individual and to the objectivity of his decision—with the reservation, to be sure, that in the case of the validity of the administration of the sacraments (where the salvation of another comes into play) and in the case of the duty-bound protection of others' rights, tutiorism be applied. [3] Here we have an exemplary balance of viewpoints: on the one hand, man cannot dispose of another's salvation or his rights and is thus limited in his right to take risks when the other is vitally concerned. Here “security” becomes a guiding principle. But on the other hand, security cannot become the determining principle of human morality in general because the man who no longer risks anything, only holding his ground and protecting himself, behaves contrary to the ethical claim of his nature, directed as it is to the unfolding of his gifts, to self-giving, and thereby also to self-risking; only in this way will man find himself.
We see the same basic attitude also in the ancient ethical teachings further developed by Christian tradition. For these the determining idea is that virtue, that is, ethically appropriate behavior, always represents a middle ground between excess and renunciation, such that this medietas, this living-in-the-proper-middle, is not to be confused with mediocritas, with a lukewarm mediocrity that remains simply beneath the demands placed upon man. The middle can very well be a maximum, a peak, but exactly such as will be found to be that center of gravity able to bear human existence between two abysses. Thus virtue stands, on the one hand, opposed to hybris, immoderation, in which man misses himself. Misrepresenting the truth about himself and the truth about reality, he tries to be a god, and failing to respect his own limits and those of others, he becomes the destroyer of being rather than its shepherd. [4] On the other hand, the morality of the Desert Fathers emphasized that the greatest temptation to the monk was acedia, discouragement, which trusts itself with nothing and thus leads to inertia, to a deadening of the heart, to a renunciation that parades as virtue, confusing itself with humility, but which is in truth a renunciation of existing, a renunciation of morality, and so the real denial of God and man. [5]
Antiquity, in comparison, emphasized as the appropriate attitude of man sophrosyne, the reasonableness which recognizes man’s limit and which is objectivity and rationality; rationality, however, with the sense for ethical responsibility. It seems important that in both the ancient and Christian moral systems the fundamental cardinal virtue, the essential cornerstone of ethics, is prudentia ("good sense"), that is, the objectivity which is, of course, not to be understood in the sense of a functional neutrality abstracted from the human element, but as the eye for what befits man and for what is the truth of things. Also, in the Christian moral system in which caritas becomes the real heart of what is ethical, the cardinal virtues (as opposed to the new order of the theological virtues) remain the fundamental human basis, and in this sense human reasonableness, the human limit recognized by prudentia, remains the cornerstone of what is ethical. [6]
The new formulation of the question in relationship to man and machine
With the appearance of technological systems human work has reached new dimensions which necessarily entail a new dimension in the formulation of ethical, and particularly social-ethical, questions. From the viewpoint of ethics, what can we identify as the new and essential element of the machine and of the technological systems which the age of natural science has produced? I believe we can single out three elements in a rough sketch.
First, man has, so to speak, put into the machine his own spirit, indeed a whole system of spiritual processes, so that it functions independently in the previously created chain of systems and is not in need of ever-new decisions. Indeed once the system is operating, it excludes them. This means that, in this transferral of one’s own spirit into the apparatus, a previously established form of behavior becomes frozen or is multiplied with a predetermined and limited number of variants that are included. Capability for the ever-new ethical decision and its restraining function in the face of varying circumstances is not included. That could actually mean that in the machine, tutiorism is in a certain sense introduced, for the machine does not offer a free, independent decision but the reproduction of a system of human insights about the functioning of natural laws.
Secondly, characteristic of the technological systems that result from the interaction of mechanical processes is the centralization of human achievements. On the one hand, they free the individual from the burden of ever having to master the whole set of tasks of a human life and thus make specialization possible as freedom—also in the form of free time. On the other hand, they create a general dependence of the individual, who is no longer responsible for himself, and of the society as a whole, on the centralized achievements. It is well known that with the individual’s loss of power and his dependence upon vast systems, totally new forms of constraint and threats to the individual also appear, which must be balanced by new forms of responsibility and assurances of freedom and life.
Thirdly, with the greater control of nature and man through systems of technology, there goes hand in hand a deeper intrusion into the inner structure of the universe and the energies shaping it and thereby a reaching out into the dimension of time, into the world in which future generations will live. Along with the increase of man’s power, reaching out also entails modes of correspondingly increased responsibility for the world entrusted to man and for the rights of others, especially those of coming generations. At the same time, it would certainly be an exaggeration to want to solve today the energy problems of coming generations and to carry out their task. That is a denial of the human spirit’s ever-new ability to discover. On the other hand, however, the preservation, so to speak, of the rights of the as yet unborn must also be a concern of every present generation.
To these three characteristics of machines and systems of machines as seen from the viewpoint of ethics, there must correspond three modes of security.
First, human responsibility not only demands that man set up in the machine or systems of machines the ability to function—that is, to establish in such not only a ratio technica—but it also demands that he structure into the systems of machines a responsibility for men, man’s ethical sense. This means that those restraining mechanisms which would guarantee human responsibility for individual cases must be incorporated into its functioning. Expressed differently, the ratio technica must incorporate into itself the ratio ethica so that one will be able to speak of something truly functioning only when a fully responsible functioning is assured. We must look for that reasonable balance of risk and security which reflects fundamentally the nature of human activity.
Second, the demands on the ethical dimension of the functional ratio set up in a system must grow proportionally with the dependence generated by the whole system and the danger entailed for a large group of people.
Third, this incorporation of the ratio ethica into the ratio technica must correspond also to the degree of the intrusion into the fabric of the universe and into the future of life. The intrusion may never be of such a kind that it would have to eliminate the very foundation of life for an extended period of time. Here it is again valid that between tutiorism and hybris the limit of prudentia must govern that ethical and humanly determined objectivity which finds the correct middle and thus the true height of human existence.
Security and freedom as the starting point for technological activity
When security appears today as a principle opposed in a certain respect to technological advancement and as a restriction of technology which technology itself should exercise, it is worthwhile to consider that the origin of technology lay essentially in man’s desire for security. Contrary to the notion of urban civilizations with their pastoral poetry and of the technologically overcrowded regions with their ecological romanticism, primitive man did not experience nature as the protective, peaceful homeland, as something virginal and original. For him the experience of nature was rather the experience of the unfamiliar and threatening, of uncontrollable danger, in which unknown forces were at work and against which he tried to protect himself in various ways. The whole realm of magic rituals attempted to meet these dangerous powers even if the religious phenomenon as a whole could certainly not be reduced to the dictum Timor fecit deos (Fear created the gods).
Technology thus appears as the reasonable way to protect man from the dangerous power of nature and to transform nature from being a threat to being the peaceful home of human existence. Technology does not meet the unknown with irrational conjuring, but it recognizes the rationality of nature and joins with it the rationality of man. Thus, technology appears as the liberation of man from irrational fear, a fear which it renders unfounded through a rationally grounded security. Accordingly, one can say that technology originally arose as the means for assuring man’s security, that it wanted to be and should be liberation as the guarantee of security: man need no longer fear the cosmos because he knows it, and, in knowing it, he understands how to control it.
Technology was at first the banishing of fear, until the unexpected change came. What had triumphed over man’s primitive fears now let loose a new danger, its own—the danger of the unbridled power of the human spirit that is not ethically formed. The work of man which should protect him becomes the real danger to both man and world. In a remarkable paradox, the danger of the domesticated powers of nature itself are breaking through again on a different plane. Nature, gripped in its very core by man, now shows its final indomitability. It slips out of the hand of the magician’s apprentice who is unable to find the saving word of ethics that could bring to a halt his own work once his actions and their unrelenting advance have been set in motion. Both the human intrusion into nature and nature’s own power, a power that was elicited and set free in the intrusion, produce through their interaction a new kind of danger. It extends far beyond the archaic dangers of old and can even make those seem idyllic in hindsight, regardless of how little idyllic they were for the man actually delivered up to those forces.
If it is correct that the essential starting point of technology lay in the acquisition of freedom by assuring security, then the essential demand upon every technological development and its guiding principle must be that greater insecurity and less freedom not arise from the increase of dependences. Technological developments must recognize that technological activity as such is not liberating—and thus ethical—behavior (as it seemed in the beginning). Rather, technological activity must be guided by ethical principles in order to satisfy its own origins which lay in an ethical ideal.
The inner unity of the ethical guidelines for individual and society
This necessary dialectic of technological development can, of course, only be met if man grasps in general the dialectic of the Enlightenment and of progress—that is, if he does not misunderstand progress as the self-intensifying, limitless drive to satisfy all demands, or misunderstand the history of freedom as the continual increase of the freedom to move about. He must realize that the intensification of his external control over matter, with its assurance of greater material security and freedom, need not shift to its opposite, into a fundamental threat to man's existence and to the world. But he must realize that this shift can only be avoided on the condition that he does not consider material security a goal in itself, but rather as the possibility for greater inner freedom and renunciation, which alone can lead him to himself. In other words: If the dialectic of progress is not to become a dialectical shift from liberation to destruction, then it must be lived as a dialectic of change from the external to the internal, from the freedom to move about to an inner freedom. This means that the question of security, which has moved with the rise of technological systems from a question of individual ethics to social ethics, still leads back to a common, responsible individual-ethical core without which the questions of social-ethics are not resolved. Nothing can replace the individual moral conscience and personal decision. Here also is a dialectic or reciprocity which we have obscured all too often with a kind of technological collectivism that would view man as really only a system within systems. We can control the problem of progress only when, in the correct prudentia and sophrosyne, the field of tension between risk and responsibility, between expansion of life and the acceptance of a limit and of the possibility of renunciation becomes the fundamental rule of our activity.
We could also say: One can never take without giving. To develop technological possibilities in proper harmony with the development of a security that always corresponds to the new possibilities costs something and calls for a restriction of the pure will to rule and to use. However, the control of progress and the respective problem of security involves more than merely a balancing of costs and benefits. It involves bringing the ethical content of the human domination of the earth to bear on the theoretical and practical business of ruling. Man's progress lies not in having more, but in being more; progress that leads only to having more is not progress at all. Progress should never be understood simply in the sense of a material “more" nor in the sense of ethical independence. It must be understood in the sense of greater service among men, of deeper communication, and of liberation for what is real, which is essentially liberation for renunciation and liberation from purely material demands. To be set free from morality is not freedom, but rather the unlocking of the forces of destruction. The true security and freedom of man consists in the rule of morality (ethos). This inner security of man teaches him also the paths to the right means of external security, and it gives him, within that tension field between security and openness, the ability to judge the new claims upon his life.
— Translated by Peter Verhalen, O. Cist., from the German edition of Communio, 1982, no. 1.
M. Kriele, Befreiung und politische Aufklarung (Freiburg, 1980), p. 76f. Kriele works out impressively the destructive consequences of an identification of the ethical-political and the scientific-technological enlightenment over the technological: “The ‘seed for regress’ however does not lie in scientific-technological thinking in itself. It lies rather in the reversal of the primacy, that is, in scientific-technological thinking’s claim to rule over morality, a claim which can intensify to a restless absorption of all morality” (p. 76).
M. Horkheimer and Th. Adorno, Dialektik der Aufklarung (Amsterdam, 1947; reprinted in Frankfurt, 1969); compare critically with Kriele’s work, pp. 172-78; R. Spaemann, “Die christliche Religion und das Ende des modemen Bewusstseins,” Internationale katholische Zeitschrift: Communio, 1979, no. 3, pp. 251-270, especially p. 268ff.
Compare P. Hadrossck, “Tutiorismus,” Lexikon fur Theologie und Kirche 10 (1966): 415ff.
Compare Pieper, Auskunft ilberdie Tugenden (Zurich, 1970).
Compare G. Holzherr, Die Benediktsregel: EineAnleitung zu christlichem Leben (Einsiedeln, 1980), p. 105ff.; p. 206ff.
Compare J. Pieper, Das Viergespann, (Munich, 1964), pp. 13-64; also by Pieper, Buchstabierilbungen, (Munich, 1980), pp. 39-65; pp. 109-130.